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Abstract
The valuation of synergy is vital to the success of any merger, however, given
current valuation methodologies and the complexity of the task; it is also the most
challenging element of merger and acquisition pricing. Conventional valuation
methods assume that sales figures and market share of the acquiring company are
easily transferable within the new entity. Current synergy practices also assume
amalgamating various corporate functions will produce significant cost reductions.
The key component missing from current methodologies is the failure to analyze
every corporation as a complex system containing various elements and relations.
If such a delicate system is segmented due to a merger, the outcome measured in
turnover and profit figures can not be accurately forecasted by simply aggregat-
ing key financial figures. The goal of this article is to go beyond the simplicity
of current methods in order to develop a methodology better suited for evaluating
synergy effects. This new approach integrates elements from both the framework
of knowledge management and the sociological theory of systems and elements.
The alternative methods proposed in this article will simultaneously deliver cre-
ative and innovative solutions to enhance the success of mergers and acquisitions.
These new proposals also help to clarify the short comings plaguing traditional
methods which inevitably lead to the destruction of shareholder wealth.
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1 Introduction
Globalization and economies of scale effects fuel corporate merger activities in nearly
every sector. Nevertheless empirical studies have shown that most mergers and acqui-
sitions fail to be successful and destroy shareholders wealth. If the firm’s management
has a clear picture of the relationship between the take-over premium and the requested
return of synergy in the future, some irrational decisions can be avoided.1
Hence this article has a twofold aim: First aim is to create a benchmark, which will al-
low success to be accurately measured in a merger. The second goal is to demonstrate
that proper evaluation and accurate forecasts of synergy effects most extend beyond the
simple aggregation of key financial figures. Therefore a new method is proposed for
valuation of synergy which integrates elements from both the framework of knowledge
management and the sociological theory.
2 Success of mergers
According to a common definition given in most finance textbooks a merger is success-
ful, when the post merger value of the integrated firm is higher than the sum of the paid
acquisition price for the acquired firm and the value of the acquiring firm prior to the
merger.2
Therefore assuming that firm A would like to merge with firm B, success could be
defined as follows:
V 0C > P
0
B + V
0
A (1)
V0C = Value of the combined firm AB in period 0, P
0
B= Acquisition price for firm B in period 0, V
0
A =
Value of firm A in period 0
Defining success in this way bears the advantage of applying well-known investment
criteria such as net present value: Consequently, investments with a positive net present
value of a future cash flow stream can be deemed a success. The sum of acquisition
price and value of firm A could be interpreted as payout in period 0 and the value of
the combined firm C could be seen as a future return on investment.
Only synergies, like economies of scale, for example could lead to such returns on
investment to justify a merger or acquisition. Typically synergy is defined in such a
way that the value of the combined firm C exceeds the collective values of the sepa-
rate entities.3 The total synergy value resulting from a merger equals the difference
between the combined firm value and the sum of each individual firm value (equation
3).
V 0C > V
0
A + V
0
B (2)
S0C = V
0
C − (V 0A + V 0B) (3)
1In the following, the expressions "merger" and "acquisition" are used as synonyms.
2For example Brealey, Myers, Allen, 2005, p. 826f.
3In general synergy effects are of central importance in nearly every scientific discipline. Expressions
like mutualism, win-win situations, critical mass, co-evolution, threshold effects, and non-zerosumness are
used as synonyms. Compare, Corning, 2003, p. 6.
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V0C = Value of the combined firm AB in period 0, V
0
A = Value of firm A in period 0, V
0
B = Value of firm
B in period 0, S0C= Value of synergy in total in period 0;
The acquisition price frequently exceeds the value of firm B, due to the additional pre-
mium paid to shareholders of firm B. Selecting the market capitalization of a company
as a benchmark for corporate value, the acquisition price per share is in many cases 40-
60 percent higher than the actual share price.4 For many obvious reasons, shareholders
of firm B will not sell or exchange their shares if they are unable to realize a higher
price relative to the stock market. Therefore the premium given to shareholders can be
seen as an incentive to part with their existing stock. The acquiring company is willing
to pay this requested premium to shareholders as a much greater return on synergy is
expected to result from the merger. Consequently, the premium payout to the seller
could be interpreted as the seller’s synergy premium (equation 4). The buyer’s synergy
premium is merely the difference between the total synergy and seller’s premium (see
equation 5).
P 0B = V
0
B + S
0
SP (4)
S0C − S0SP = S0BP (5)
P0B = Acquisition price in period 0, V
0
B = Value of firm B in period 0, S
0
SP = Seller’s synergy premium
in period 0, S0BP= Buyer’s synergy premium in period 0;
Success of any merger implies that the net present value of the buyer’s synergy pre-
mium is at least slightly positive. Rewriting equation (1), success of a merger can be
defined as follows:
V 0C − (V 0A + V 0B)− S0SP > 0 (6)
Even though a positive buyer’s synergy premium signifies the criterion for a successful
merger has been satisfied, the terms may not be equitable for both sides. As primary
risk taker in the merger, share holder A should receive at least the equivalent synergy
premium as share holder B. Taking such a fair value criteria into account the total
synergy outcome from a merger for a given time period, should be twice as high as the
premium paid for the acquisition of firm B. An interest rate to reflect the time value of
money and the risk that the expected synergy would not crystallize in the future should
also be applied to the total synergy premium.
STC = [2 ∗ (P 0B − V 0B)] ∗ (1 + r)T (7)
The following considerations allow for the development of a benchmark which can
accurately assess the success of a merger. The post merger value of the integrated firm
has to be equal to or greater then the sum of the firm values A and B and the total
synergy premium. The value of a merger can be measured either in the present or the
future, as long as both figures are taken at the same point in time. Hence the benchmark
of success could be formalized at the time when the merger happens like in equation
(8) or at certain point in the Future like in equation (9).
V 0C − (V 0A + V 0B)− [2 ∗ (P 0B − V 0B)] ≥ 0 (8)
V TC − [(V 0A + V 0B) ∗ (1 + rf )T ]− [2 ∗ (P 0B − V 0B) ∗ (1 + r)T ] ≥ 0 (9)
4Moeller, Schlingemann, Stulz, 2005, p. 757.
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V0C = Value of the combined firm in period 0, V
0
A = Value of firm B in period 0, V
0
B = Value of firm B
in period 0 P0B = Acquisition price in period 0, rf = risk-free interest rate, r = risk-adjusted interest rate, T =
fixed point of time in Future;
3 Different elements - different pricing
The definition of success shows that any merger and acquisition pricing should contain
three elements:
• Valuation of the acquired corporate system B and the acquiring corporate system
A
• Valuation of the new corporate system C
• Division of synergy premium between seller and buyer
It is imperative that the new firm C be valued independently from the pricing process
of the corporations A and B, as synergies will only arise if the two economic systems
merge and form a new single unit. Consequently, throughout the pricing process, it
is essential corporate C be treated as a new economic system. Given this logic, the
precise value of C can not be determined by the sum of A and B plus some synergy.
System theory provides a holistic view of what transpires during the merger process,
and may be used as a guideline. According to this approach, a corporation should be
observed as a complex economic system of elements and relations which are dependent
upon each other. A company is an open system, insofar as it exists in mutual relation
(in- and output relations) to its environment. Every element in a firm is organically
linked with one another in the firm’s system of organization, corporate culture, organi-
zational routines and activities.5 Sales, turnover and profit are directly correlated to the
regular interaction of interrelated groups of activities within a corporate system. Merg-
ers disrupt this harmonic balance through the removal and addition of certain elements
and corporate functions. As a direct result of this modification, the measurable output
in the form of sales, revenue, and turnover will also vary significantly. The merger
of two intricate systems leads to the creation of a new corporate system; firm C, with
its own distinctive elements and relations. Any valuation of such a system, given its
uniqueness and individuality, requires a separate pricing process.
Output categories such as sales, turnover, profit or EBIT are completely intertwined
within corporate systems which frequently interact with one another. Relationships
between variables can also be illustrated through the use of mathematical functions.
Therefore profit is directly correlated to a corporate system function with its variables
’a’, which symbolize corporate functions such as, the sales, production, finance etc.
Subsequently the expected profit of the new entity C is the outcome of the corporate
system function of C with its merged corporate functions of system A and system B.
Relations between variables within the system function are not linked by value additiv-
ity.
5Gupta, Ross, 2001, p. 297.
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Profit A = f(a1, a2, a3, a4....) (10)
Profit C = f(a1b1, a2b2, a3b3, a4b4.......) (11)
The following graphic visualizes this way of thinking in system categories.
Corporate system A
a1
a4a3
a2Input Output
Sales
Turnover
Profit
EBIT
Figure 1: The corporate system
The valuation process of firms A and B differs significantly from the valuation process
of firm C. Pricing firms A and B is made slightly easier given their existing systems
and assuming the elements and relations within the systems will not be modified or
split. With the process of performance unaltered, valuation of A and B can be found in
various sources of codified and publicly available information, such as turnover, EBIT
etc., located in balance sheets and business reports. No additional knowledge of the
corporate system function is required for the valuation of A and B. Contrary to this,
firm C constitutes a unique corporate system; hence its valuation requires additional
internal information concerning the relations and elements within the system. With-
out an existing system in place, a performance projection of system C could only be
derived from internal and system specific knowledge about elements and relations of
system A and system B. Codified knowledge about the performance of firm C in the
form of balance sheets or business reports seizes to exist. Codified knowledge pertain-
ing to A and B is less resourceful due to an absence of value additivity. Therefore it is
imperative that any pricing of firm C request system specific knowledge of A and B in
order to develop a vision regarding the interaction of elements and relations in the new
system C, as well as, all future performance processes.
This new approach to valuation of mergers refers to the theory of knowledge man-
agement, which distinguishes between two forms of knowledge: implicit and explicit
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knowledge.6 Applied to the merger problem, revenue, sales, turnover, earnings, profit
are the outcomes of a system and could be interpreted as explicit information. Infor-
mation concerning the relationships between the single elements within a corporate
system could be called the tacit or implicit knowledge. Explicit and implicit elements
of knowledge are complimentary to each other and are not considered mutually ex-
clusive.7 This principle of knowledge management, applied to the identification of
synergy sources in a merger, can lead to a more holistic view of corporate value. Rec-
ognizing tacit knowledge contributes as well to the identification of synergy.
4 Valuation of the new corporate system C
In certain aspects the valuation process of synergies bears some analogy to corporate
risk management: both focus on business processes analysis, are future oriented, deal
with uncertainty and aggregate all information about risks and synergies into a single
overall figure. Apparently the difference is that synergies are the chance or the positive
result of an uncertain definite event. Synergy and operational risk could be seen as
two sides of the same medal as the risk of a merger is that expected synergies fail to
materialize. The task of corporate risk management is to identify the risks inherent
in the different steps of a business process, selecting a set of variables, providing an
estimate for the likelihood and severity of operational risk and designing a control
mechanism. Adopting this general structure for the process of risk management allows
the valuation process of synergies to be divided into the three phases: identification,
documentation and integration planning and evaluation.
4.1 Identification of synergy
Identifying potential synergy effects requires a good understanding of the strengths and
weaknesses of corporate systems A and B business processes, in order to develop a vi-
sion regarding the future performance of system C. Synergy is neither given by posses-
sion of resources nor inherent in tangible or intangible corporate assets. Synergy is the
end result of amalgamating existing resources in a uniquely redesigned combination.
The unification of resources to maximize value is a business process. Consequently
identification of synergy has to observe a corporation in a new perspective as an orga-
nized system of business processes. The primary focus must be on business processes
as a key indicator for the ability of an organization to deliver its products or services in
a timely and efficient manner. Any business process contains three key dimensions:
1. Human resources; the most important intangible corporate asset. Due to special-
ization, only a few key personnel have specific knowledge regarding business
processes and its interactions with other people and systems within the firm.
2. Technology; most broadly defined as the entities, both material and immaterial,
created by the application of mental and physical effort in order to achieve some
value. This definition includes tools and machines as well as business methods,
software or techniques to solve specific problems.8
6Polanyi, 1967, p. 19.
7Nonaka, Takeuchi, 1997, p. 8.
8"technology", wikipedia, 2007.
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3. Organization; corporate business processes are embedded in a peculiar corporate
organization characterized by hierarchy levels, decision making lines, functions
and culture.
Identification of synergy in a merger begins with comparing similar business processes
of firms A and B. Subsequently, analyse the efficiency, strengths and weaknesses of
each corporation and finally adopt the superior technology, the better organization or
the better trained human resources.9 Furthermore identification of synergy implies
"Reengineering of business processes" as it combines and organizes given resources in
a new way to realize an added value. The expression Business Process Reengineering
first used 1990 by Hammer, is defined as "term process innovation, which encompasses
the envisioning of new work strategies, the actual process activity, and the implementa-
tion of the change in all its complex technological, human, and organizational dimen-
sions."(Davenport, 1993)
How could this identification process materialize? The optimal solution would be a
web-based 3-D visualization of all business process of firm A and B on split screens.
This visualization of corporate business processes on parallel computer screens would
make it easy to discover points of overlap for comparison and to develop new business
processes with existing resources. However, despite the tremendous progress made in
interactive web-applications in recent years this kind of 3D-visualization of all corpo-
rate business processes is still wishful thinking. Nevertheless this ideal solution could
lead to a potential breakthrough in the amount of information and documentation nec-
essary to identify synergy effects. Central business processes that involve employees,
suppliers and clients from both firms have to be documented in a kind of map. The
data has to be edited with information about human resources, job descriptions and
organization diagrams. Because "hidden" system specific information is not codified
in documents, it is time-consuming to generate and requires the physical presence of
analysts within the systems. The documentation phase is followed by an assessment
of the organizations strengths and weaknesses which enables analysts to identify po-
tential opportunities - especially technological and human resource openings. Perfor-
mance targets and benchmark results involved in the merger contribute to the redesign
of existing business processes. Afterwards a process vision is developed by selecting
strategic relevant business processes for reengineering and the subsequent formulating
of a prototype for the new business process design after the merger.
4.2 Integration planning for redesigned business processes
After the business processes of the new corporate system C are identified, designed
and prototyped the planning phase for implementation of the new business concept
starts. This step involves detailed planning for how to incorporate resources (technol-
ogy, human resources and organization) from corporate systems A and B into operation
within the new system C. Evaluation of the new system C requests that planning the
post-merger integration starts prior to the closure of the merger, otherwise returns and
integration are unable to be calculated. Synergies have to be clearly defined and trans-
formed into measurable integration targets. Similar to project management, it includes
9Of course in the case of human resources adoption is not as easy; The analysis has to be more detailed
concerning the reasons, why this employee in this specific type of business process performs much better
than his colleague.
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the definition of various targets measured in concrete figures, a breakdown in mile-
stones and deadlines, work plans and target completion dates. Integration planning
has to determine which corporate functions (marketing, treasury, IT etc.) are involved
in reaching this target and which members will assume leadership throughout the in-
tegration process. Integration planning cannot be performed in a top-down approach
because of the complexity involved and the minimal staff backing. Incorporating staff
members into the planning process during the primary stages of integration should be
the highest priority. Staff involvement, combined with transparent corporate commu-
nication are crucial for reaching strategic goals. The result of integration planning is a
detailed roadmap laying out the accomplishments needed in each area of the company,
individual responsibilities, and completion dates. 10
Dumay criticizes this way of process thinking as a purely technocratic management per-
spective of organization which mainly ignores the central role of management within
organizations. "In such a view, organizations are the means to accomplish the objec-
tives of the organization’s owners. These objectives are embedded within a corporate
strategy that is realized by business processes."11 To seize this criticism integration
planning has to pay equal attention to non-technical organizational elements like so-
cial structure, rules of conduct, corporate culture, communication and participants in
order to facilitate the restructuring of business performance processes. This is in line
with the concept of "Human Due Diligence" supported by Harding, 2007, which gives
priority to structural and cultural aspects of corporate organization. However as the im-
plementation of a new corporate organization with the transformation of existing social
structures, reporting lines and corporate cultures leads to an increase in costs it should
be accounted for in the evaluation process.
4.3 Valuation of corporate system C
Following the identification of synergy effects and integration planning the new cor-
porate system C is no longer a black box for evaluation. On the contrary, the box is
filled with expert knowledge concerning the future system of business processes and its
implementation given the existing resources of system A and B. In general, the value
of an asset is derived by its capacity to generate cash flows. The preceding work of
mapping and redesign of business processes visualizes the way to achieve value within
a corporate system. The used investment appraisal method has to make use of this
information pool
• By forecasting the net cash flows from projected single business processes,
• A risk assessment regarding the underlying uncertainty of key variables for cash
flow forecast
• And a quantification of systemic risk as business processes within a corporate
system are naturally correlated.
A simple discounted cash flow approach, like the Net Present Value method, is not ca-
pable of processing the risk and return information in an appropriate manner because
the risk is solely incorporated in the discount factor. The discount factor contains a risk
free interest rate which reflects the time value of money and a risk premium capital
10Bruner, 2004, p. 891.
11Dumay, 2004, p. 17.
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that investors request as a return rate for investment opportunities with similar risk (op-
portunity costs). The risk premium has to be interpreted as a premium for systematic
(or market) risk, not for unsystematic project risk. For example the often employed
weighted average capital cost as a rate for discounting, uses explicitly the beta factor
to express market risk. Therefore the specific risk of the investment project (unsys-
tematic risk) should be represented by a modification of cash flow variables within the
present value formula. Corporate finance textbooks propose three methods to figure
in the underlying risk of cash flow forecasts in the present value formula: Sensitivity
analysis, scenario analysis and Monte Carlo Simulation. The wealth of information
generated by the analysis of existing corporate systems and the developed vision of the
future system allows for the use of all three methods of risk return analysis, as each ap-
proach is able to deliver valuable information for the merger decision. The sensitivity
analysis provides investors an idea of the major risk factors. Scenario analysis answers
the questions, what happens if anything goes wrong or if everything works out to be
optimal. Monte Carlo simulation provides a complete risk/return profile of all possible
outcomes and utilizes all given information. Additional calculation costs for employ-
ing all three methods seems to be negligible relative to the added value of information.
Corporation C exists as a vision of projected operational processes combined with a
plan for its implementation. Starting point for the evaluation is a cash flow forecast for
each operational process involved with the value chain. Besides operational processes,
the corporate system includes management processes and other supporting processes
which govern and facilitate the general operation of the system. Because these pro-
cesses are not directly involved in generating cash, their value has to be incorporated
as variable or fixed costs in the cash flow forecast of operational processes. The cash
flow forecast of modified or unchanged operational processes may utilize available in-
formation regarding revenues and costs of existing operational processes in systems A
and B. Obviously cash flow forecasts for newly designed processes of system C are
faced with a higher degree of uncertainty as revenues and costs have to be projected.
The cash flow forecast for each (operational) business process is performed in detail
for three to five periods and concludes with the calculation of a terminal value, which
is the discounted value of all future cash flow beyond a given date (figure 2). Assum-
ing that after the projected horizon of three to five years, cash flows will continue to
grow indefinitely at a constant rate, the cash flow stream is termed a growing perpetu-
ity and may be calculated as a present value of an infinite geometric series. Results of
integration planning determine the timeline for revenues and integration costs for each
process. Finally net cash flow result of one business process ’n’ is discounted for each
period ’t’ and summed up for all business processes to one present value of all future
net cash flows of corporate system C (equation 12).
V 0C =
N∑
n=1
T∑
t=1
NCFnt
(1 + r)t
(12)
V0C = Value of the combined firm in period 0, NCF
n
t = net cash flow of business process n in period t, r =
discount rate (WACC - Weighted Average Cost of Capital), n = number of business processes, t = period of
time;
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Corporate System C
Business Process (1)
Cash Inflow
Market share x%
Price * Volume
Cash Outflow
Variable Costs
Fixed Costs
(Integration costs)
Depreciation
Tax
Net Cash Flow BP (1)
Business Process (2)
Cash Inflow
Market share x%
Price * Volume
Cash Outflow
Variable Costs
Fixed Costs
(Integration costs)
Depreciation
Tax
Net Cash Flow BP (2)
Business Process (3)
Cash Inflow
Market share x%
Price * Volume
Cash Outflow
Variable Costs
Fixed Costs
(Integration costs)
Depreciation
Tax
Net Cash Flow BP (3)
Period 1
Period 3
Period 2
Terminal Value
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Figure 2: Evaluation of Corporate System C
However, outcomes of the evaluation process can’t be expressed in a single present
value figure as the assessment of future developments are characterized by uncertainty
which has to be incorporated in the appraisal model. The information and transparency
concerning the overall risk and its specific sources in a merger project is exceedingly
valuable for any decision maker, despite the fact that the assumed risk environment is
extremely subjective due to human involvement.12 For example the assumed market
share and the derived sales volume and sales prices for each period are risk variables
as they are critical to the viability of the project. In such cases, a sales manager could
be asked about the probability to reach a market share of x-percent within a given
time period.13 In general, based on the opinion of experts for every risk variable, a
probability function can be defined. Afterwards the systemic risk has to be defined,
which implies to fix correlations for interrelations between:
• risk variables of each business process in each period
• risk variables of each business process between observed periods
• variables between the business processes within the corporate system
The result of the risk analysis is a risk/return profile of the merger project, which can be
shown through the use of a diagram. In the case of a scenario analysis, the risk return
profile consists of a few points which signal the probability of worst, medium or best
case scenarios. Monte Carlo Simulation provides the most thorough analysis by using
a full picture display to show all possible risk and return combinations. A cumulative
probability distribution, which implies arranging the present value results in ascending
12Distinction between "risk" and "uncertainty"
13Description of risk assessment process for example see: Vose, 2002, p. 6f.
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order, eases to observe the degree of probability for an expected project result.14 At this
stage of evaluation the beforehand formalized definition of success could be used as a
benchmark (see equation 8 and 9). The probability that firm C’s present value exceeds
the sum of present values of firm A and firm B and the defined total synergy premium
should be in excess of 50 percent. However the ultimate decision for a merger is
contingent upon the investor’s appetite for risk. The risk/return profile merely provides
transparency for the investors risk attitudes.15
4.4 External or internal evaluation teams?
Finally just one question remains for discussion, who should perform the extensive
data and process mining in the identification phase of evaluation? In general there
are four conceivable alternatives: An internal management team of the acquirer (firm
A), an internal management team composed of firm A and B, an external private audit
company or an external public audit institution. For selecting the most appropriate type
of inquiring unit, four determinants have to be observed:
1. Naturally investigation teams must cope with a myriad of problems, ranging
from asymmetric information; Evaluation processes have contrasting points of
view; those based on system internal process information, which fail to take full
advantage of information asymmetries, and others based on external output fig-
ures, which take a broader approach. Nevertheless any information deficiencies
can be minimized by including management staff from firms A and B.
2. Clearly, each employee of firm A or B is directly affected by the merger. Fears
and concerns regarding job security or redesigned functions often permeate into
the merger process, culminating in the loss of highly skilled personnel to a com-
petitive labour market. Merger situations are often characterized by individual
uncertainties and a state of persistence, which burdens the overall company per-
formance. Human resource involvement from both A and B early in the merger
process can be interpreted as a pre-emptive move to create trust and credibility.
However a personal deep involvement of investigators could block the view for
restructuring of existing or the development of new business processes. For this
purpose people have to take look from a distance. Investigation teams, irrespec-
tive of being in- or outsiders, requires a straightforward corporate communica-
tion of the overall vision for the merger, progress reports and the critical roles of
employees within the integration process, in order to foster a trusting relation-
ship between management and staff from both firms. Corporate communication
is critical in determining the level of collaboration between corporate staff of
both companies.
3. Under conventional due diligence the primary focus is restricted to the target
acquired company. However information must also be requested from the ac-
quiring company A in order to obtain more accurate and reliable synergy effects.
Identification of synergy continuously entails the analysis of two business mod-
els of varying strengths and weaknesses, while a merger of companies implies
the fusion of two complex systems with diverse elements and relations.
14Savvides, 1994, p. 16.
15The risk/return data could be edited by calculation of an expected value and several ratios like the
expected loss ratio.
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There could be some doubt if internal investigation teams have the needed ex-
traordinary degree of reflexivity: knowing their company’s own strengths and
weaknesses, comparing them with those of the target company and developing a
vision for the combined corporate system.
4. The targeted visualization and analysis of all important business processes un-
locks the vault to the most valuable resource a company owns: the intellectual
property. Comparable to the source code used to design software, it tells every-
one how to combine resources to achieve value. Product piracy in the sense of
illegal reproduction of products leads to considerable losses in sales and profit.
Nevertheless pirates still must devise a way to replicate production. In the case
of a merger, the acquiring company exposes all of its safeguarded business pro-
cesses, similar to a chef’s cooking recipes which detail each ingredient and the
production processes involved. Therefore knowledge of business processes is the
highest form of intellectual property a corporation possess and must be protected
by the highest security measures possible. The identification and evaluation of
synergies prepares the field for management’s decision if a merger between com-
panies makes economically sense. Taking this uncertainty concerning the final
merger decision into account, no internal investigation team should be trusted
with 100% control of data mining. External audit team’s primary focus is to
handle secure data; however system internal data has a different quality com-
pared to external data such as balance sheets and business reports. Given this
logic, it would be wise to allow a public audit institution, acting as a trust broker
within a merger process, access to the security of intellectual property.
5 Impact on Management decision
The high failure rate of mergers provides a constant stimulus to reflect the common
praxis of merger pricing and the underlying theoretical appraisal models. The pre-
ceding review of the merger problem was aimed at putting forth creative and unique
solutions in order to increase the success rate of mergers.
New answers were proposed to the frequently asked questions, how much is too much?
Or are merger premiums too high? Equipped with the preceding knowledge, one must
interpret any premium paid, in addition to the market price of the target firm, as a
seller’s premium for future synergy effects. The acquiring firm’s shareholders will in-
variably burden the risk when any payout occurs in t=0, while the shareholders of the
target firm bear a diminutive risk. Consequently, the acquiring firm’s shareholders re-
quest an equivalent synergy premium to that of the seller. Taking these aspects into
account the message for managers becomes clearer: Premiums should only be paid out
if there is a reasonable expectation that the total synergy effect to be realized in the
future is at least twice as high as the premium plus risk-adjusted compound interest.
A merger constitutes a new corporate system C to be built up by the fusion of complex
corporate systems A and B with diverse elements and relations. Codified knowledge
taken out of balance sheets and business reports provides a sufficient data basis for eval-
uation if the performance processes of existing corporate system remain unchanged.
However mergers are done with the intention of improving or modifying existing pro-
cesses as well as installing new ones. Therefore investors have to open the "box" to
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gain an inside view and to generate system internal information. Further complicating
matters, system "box C" does not exist yet. Therefore it is imperative that any pricing
of firm C requests system specific knowledge of A and B in order develop a vision
regarding the future performance processes and interaction of elements and relations
in the new system C. This different view on a merger process has several implications:
• Under conventional due diligence the primary focus is restricted to the acquired
company. To identify synergy effects under the system based method, a two-way
perspective is required to continuously analyze both business models strengths
and weaknesses. Therefore, investors require an extraordinary degree of reflex-
ivity: knowing their company’s own strengths and weaknesses, comparing them
with those of the target company and developing a vision for the combined cor-
porate system.
• Due diligence teams require new actors with a diverse set of skills and should be
comprised of individuals with a vast experience and solid understanding of each
firm’s core business. The investment appraisal is dependent on expert knowl-
edge. Synergy assessments performed by risk managers may lead to further
changes in the value because of the similarities that exist with corporate risk
management.
• To generate system internal information, corporations must reveal its safely guarded
business processes in order to conduct the necessary data mining. In this sense
a merger process is always a collaborative contest waged by each firm involved.
Hostile take-overs are synonymous with information asymmetry as uninformed
investors acquire black boxes, without any substantial knowledge pertaining to
the contents. Identification phase and integration planning will commence after
each contract has been notarized, confirmation of payment and ownership trans-
ferred. In this case, payment should come in the form of stocks, as opposed to
cash, as new shareholders share both the value and risk of the merger transac-
tion.16
• A radical change is needed for the pricing process. Synergy effects crystal-
lize through an innovative or superior combination of given corporate resources,
therefore pricing begins with the identification of given processes, followed by
a vision about future business processes and its integration planning. Expert
knowledge of future business processes (system internal information) constructs
the data basis for the cash flow forecast and any additional uncertainty (unsys-
tematical risk) has to be explicitly incorporated into the pricing model.
16Rappaport, Sirower, 1999, p. 148
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